Philosoraptor’s Corner: How did the Giants get here?

I haven’t done one of these for a long time. But considering the state of the New York Giants and how their recent history has unfolded, it’s probably time to dust this piece off.

The Giants are currently 2-10 and were officially the first team mathematically eliminated from the playoffs. The Giants are also marching full speed ahead into uncharted territory.

Being eliminated from the playoffs before December has become depressingly familiar, but the fact that we don’t really have much of a clue what comes next is not. For the first time in a long, long time the team doesn’t have a clear answer who their quarterback will be next year. Only Tommy DeVito is under contract, and we don’t even know if Joe Schoen and Brian Daboll will survive long enough to select their own quarterback.

The Giants have stepped off the familiar and well-trodden path and now need to rely fully on dead reckoning to find their way.

So that brings us to the big question: How did the Giants get to this point? Well, by my reckoning, there were five crucial decisions on the path to where they currently find themselves.

Step 1 – The 2018 draft

As with so many things in life, the question of “how did we get here?” has a very long tail.

For our purposes here I’m going to start back in the distant and murky past of 2017 and 2018. The Giants had just fired Ben McAdoo and Jerry Reese and held the second overall pick. To recap a bit, McAdoo and Reese were fired in part due to the Giants’ utter collapse following their trip to the playoffs in 2016.

The 2017 season was just dismal – almost the entire receiving corps was wiped out by injury, and then the decision was made to bench Eli Manning and end his historic Iron Man streak. And while the bad season had the Giants’ leadership on the hot seat, it was how the benching of Manning was handled, as well as the resounding backlash from the media and fanbase, that got McAdoo and Reese fired.

And so, the Giants hired Dave Gettleman – who had previously been a long-time executive under Ernie Accorsi and Jerry Reese – who in turn hired Pat Shurmur.

We spent a lot of time examining the 2018 quarterback class in anticipation that the Giants would draft Eli Manning’s successor. It was becoming increasingly apparent by the end of 2017 that Eli was nearing the end of his career. His arm was in clear decline and he was also losing his ability to navigate the backfield as well. Eli was never a great athlete, but age and years in the game were degrading his ability to make the subtle adjustments in the pocket necessary to mitigate pressure, extend plays, and maximize receiving windows.

However, the implications of hiring Gettleman and Shurmur were clear in hindsight. Gettleman was an important part of the Giants’ front office for Eli’s glory years, and Shurmur was renowned for his highly QB-friendly offense. Eli was the franchise at that point, and John Mara was pretty clearly affected by the backlash against benching Manning for Geno Smith. The plan was to go all-in on Eli and (attempt to) prop his window for winning open long enough for one last run at glory.

All of that sets the stage for the first mis-step on the Giants’ path to their current 2-10 record. Namely, the decision to bypass one of the best quarterback drafts in a decade (likely since 2012) and select Saquon Barkley second overall.

Sitting here in 2024, the debate rages as to whether or not Joe Schoen made a fireable mistake in letting Barkley walk in free agency. The optics of the decision are horrible as Barkley has an MVP caliber season for a bitter rival. However, the real mistake was Gettleman’s in drafting Barkley in the first place. The idea was that having a talent like Barkley that Eli could just hand the ball to would take some of the load off of the aging quarterback. And at the time, we rationalized the decision with the knowledge that Eli’s football IQ, and the presence of Odell Beckham Jr., Sterling Shepard, and Evan Engram would prevent the defense from keying on Barkley in the run game.

But as it worked out, Eli’s decline accelerated, which hamstrung the passing attack, and Gettleman’s “rebuild” of the offensive line only made it worse. In short, the Giants were a poor foundation for Barkley and instead of providing a good foundation for the running back, they gave him a mid-game Jenga tower for support.

Step 2 – ‘Full bloom love’ in 2019

The Giants had hoped to stave off the inevitable for as long as possible by hiring Gettleman and Shurmur, as well as drafting Barkley.

However, the future arrived with a quickness and all of a sudden the Giants were faced with the reality of Life After Eli. Which, understandably, sent them scrambling to find their next franchise quarterback.

To Gettleman’s credit, he was clearly infatuated with Oregon Ducks’ quarterback Justin Herbert throughout the 2018 college season. Plans to draft Herbert as Eli’s successor were dashed when Herbert decided to return to college to play with his little brother. But the Giants didn’t want to go into the final year of Eli’s contract without a successor in place.

And so Gettleman’s infatuation with Herbert was transferred to Daniel Jones and became “full bloom love” following the latter’s performance at the Reese’s Senior Bowl.

There was skepticism regarding Jones through the Draft Process. Personally, I had a third-round grade on Jones leading up to the 2019 draft, while Dane Brugler of The Athletic had a late-second round grade on him (53rd overall). There were, obviously, aspects of Jones’ profile that were attractive. He has a prototypical build and frame for the position, an NFL caliber arm, and the ability to threaten the defense as a runner. He’s also, by all accounts, a good and likable guy, a tough SOB, and has a comforting pedigree as a David Cutcliffe product.

Of course, Jones had his flaws as well, which were known at the time and have been well-documented since. He isn’t a particularly precise passer and is at his best running a one- or two-read offense that leans heavily into half-field reads or RPOs. His processing, feel for pressure, and sack avoidance were (and are) spotty and inconsistent.

It seems unlikely that even if Jones wasn’t high on the Giants’ radar during the 2018 season, they didn’t scout him thoroughly enough to be aware of his faults. It’s much more likely that they were aware, but believed that his positive traits would outweigh his faults and they could be overcome through coaching.

And Jones did make incremental progress over the next three years, though many of his issues still persisted. At the end of the 2019 and 2020 seasons, Ed asked me for my assessment of Jones and his future. Both times I frustrated Ed by stating that, to me, Jones was a “human Rorschach test” and didn’t come down firmly on either side. Those inclined to believe in him could find evidence to support their faith, while those inclined toward skepticism could find evidence that Jones wasn’t (or wouldn’t be) The Guy.

Ultimately, Jones has proven to not be The Guy for the Giants and is now a former Giant. But that was the state of affairs when Joe Schoen and Brian Daboll were hired in 2022.

Step 3 – The foundational mistake of the current regime

There are serious questions in 2024 as to whether Joe Schoen and Brian Daboll should be allowed to stay on as the Giants’ GM and head coach. Fans are currently debating whether Schoen’s roster construction, and Daboll’s development of the drafted players, are even adequate.

And there’s certainly a debate to be had there. In particular, the Giants have allowed talented players to leave via free agency while their top draft picks haven’t played up to expectations.

However, there was another foundational mistake that hasn’t been talked about. That was the decision to treat the idea that Jones was the Giants’ starting quarterback as a given.

From 2019 to 2021, there were 38 quarterbacks who had at least 700 snaps and Jones ranked 33rd in EPA+CPOE composite. At the time, he was also working his way back from the nerve injury that ended his 2021 season.

Ed attended the first week of that first training camp in 2022. At the time, he told me candidly that Daboll and Mike Kafka were trying to install a highly sophisticated offense. The very first iteration of the Giants’ offense was built around option routes and explosive plays. Ed described it to me as being similar to the offense once run by former Giants’ offensive coordinator Kevin Gilbride.

He also told me that the results were, frankly, bad. The offense couldn’t find any traction in practice and there was a disconnect on almost every rep. Ultimately, he confided in me after that first week of practice that he was starting to think that Jones just wasn’t a good quarterback. Yet Jones retained the keys to the franchise, and it was determined that 2022 would be the year to find out for certain whether Jones was The Guy.

But it didn’t need to be.

The Giants could have held an open quarterback competition between Jones, Tyrod Taylor, and Davis Webb. That likely would have been the quickest way to know for sure whether or not Jones was “The Guy”. All due respect to Taylor and Webb, if Jones lost an open competition to one of them, it would have been pretty obvious that he wasn’t the team’s franchise quarterback. The team wouldn’t have needed a full season, and could have begun positioning themselves for the future right away. And even if the 2022 season unfolded the same way Taylor or Webb at quarterback, the team might have avoided the mistakes of the 2023 off-season

Perhaps it was due to John Mara’s obvious admiration for Jones, but a competition was never attempted. Instead, the team went into the season and strung together a series of improbable wins that had us answering the same question from fans on a weekly basis. Usually some variation of “How did they win that game!? They can’t possibly keep doing this, can they?”. And the Giants did keep doing that, riding good fortune and opponents’ mistakes into the post-season.

That led us into 2023, when the previous decisions all began to come to a head.

Step 4 – 2023: Overreaction and miscalculations

Nobody expected the Giants to make the playoffs in 2022. Most were expecting another five- or six-win season as Schoen worked to clean up the financial mess left by Gettleman. Instead, pretty much everything went right and the Giants made it to the playoffs where they drew the only opponent with a defense bad enough to make their offense look explosive.

The Giants were quickly shown the door by the Philadelphia Eagles, but that hardly dented the enthusiasm.

The Giants, spearheaded by Schoen, attempted to ride the momentum and took calculated risks to try and short-circuit the rebuilding process. The hope was that perhaps they were further along than they initially believed, and the team just needed more explosive playmakers to take the next step. The team traded for Darren Waller, signed Parris Campbell, and drafted Jalin Hyatt. The team also gave Saquon Barkley the franchise tag while also signing Daniel Jones to his big contract.

Each of the moves made by the Giants in 2023 were a calculated risk, but each of those risks blew up in the Giants’ collective face.

While the Giants’ 2022 season was a fantastic ride, there were signs that the team could – or would – regress.

For instance, the Giants led the league in ball security that year, which was a big reason for their success. However, despite having the league’s most conservative passing offense, they were middle of the pack, 17th, in turnover-worthy plays. Put simply, they were being careful with the ball, but still putting it at risk of being taken away, only for it to bounce their way. Likewise, several of their wins were the direct result of miscues by opponents which had nothing to do with the Giants’ own actions. The most obvious was Randy Bullock missing an easy field goal as time expired in Week 1, Frakie Luvu dropping an easy pick six in Week 2, or the Baltimore Ravens nullifying a crucial 3rd down conversion with an illegal formation penalty in Week 6.

So the Giants’ foundation was likely not – and actually wasn’t – nearly as sturdy as their surprising playoff run suggested.

That was the backdrop for everything to come crashing down on them in 2023. That leads us to what is, at least to me, the current regime’s cardinal sin: Failure to appropriately assess risk.

The Giants chose to ignore the fact that Waller was not the player he had been prior to two injury-ravaged years. On the flip side, they bet on Parris Campbell’s upside after just one good season. The Giants have been investing in self-scouting and developing their analytics, so they may have been aware of the threat of regression, but by all appearances they didn’t give credence to the warning signs.

It would have been hard, incredibly hard, to stay the course laid down in the 2022 off season after the events of the 2022 regular season. The Giants could have stayed true to their rebuild and not tried to chase glory following their trip to the postseason. They could have played hardball with Daniel Jones rather than cede leverage.

The common conception now is that they didn’t really have a choice in the decisions they made after 2022. I disagree, they did have a choice but the decision to delay gratification is never an easy choice to make. It likely would have pissed off fans who were starved for something to be excited about — not to mention an owner who’s probably just as desperate and exasperated as the fanbase.

I can’t adequately separate John Mara’s influence from Schoen’s decisions. Even if Mara isn’t directly instructing the Giants’ decision making process, simply being present and “making his preferences known” carries significant weight and influence. So for that reason I’m not lumping the blame squarely on Schoen’s shoulders – though he’s hardly blameless.

Perhaps they were under too much pressure from above and below to ride the wave instead of being patient. However, the team might be in a better spot today if they took a more methodical approach then.

Step 5 – 2024, aka 2018 redux

The Giants’ collapse in 2023 gifted them with something we so rarely get in this world: A true second chance.

The Giants were in a similar position to the one in which they were in 2018. While they had a quarterback whom they liked and respected, there were signs that they needed to move on. At the same time, they were faced with an exciting quarterback class in the draft and held a high pick. And as in 2018, the expectation was that the Giants would draft a quarterback highly. After all, Jones was coming off another injury (an ACL this time) and had been playing poorly before he was injured.

But to quote Mark Twain, history doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.

As they did in 2018, the Giants doubled down on their quarterback. They elected to bypass a talented quarterback class and select an explosive playmaker in the hopes that he can help elevate the quarterback’s game.

The Giants also renovated their offensive line, bringing in multiple new starters in the hopes of finally finishing that element of the rebuild.

And as happened in 2018, it quickly became apparent that they needed to go in another direction at quarterback. As we saw in 2018, skill position players seldom elevate their quarterbacks and instead often are only able to play as well as their quarterback allows. And while the exact details are different, a limited quarterback limited the offense as a whole and the playmaking skill position player is unable to transcend those limitations.

Now the Giants find themselves in an even worse position than they did in 2019. The cumulative effects of all their previous mistakes and missteps have taken their toll. The Giants have also had to endure a messy separation from the player they hoped could be their franchise quarterback, as opposed to the sad but graceful retirement of a true franchise legend. What’s more, the Giants don’t have anything like 2019 Eli to hold the team together through a transition with his respected leadership and experience.

In bypassing the 2024 quarterback class in order to commit to Daniel Jones, the Giants have realized the fears that they would put themselves in the position of forcing a pick from an inferior crop of players.

They will also need to forge ahead into uncharted waters without a veteran presence who can help a young quarterback grow.

Final thoughts: Where do we go from here?

So here we are, the Giants are 2-10, eliminated from the playoffs and unlikely to win another game this year. They need a new quarterback, as well as answers regarding several of the players on whom they’re counting to be core pieces.

There’s a whole separate piece that could be written to talk about Joe Schoen’s drafting, and maybe I’ll do that at some point.

The shorter version is that while there have been disappointments, there have also been some definite hits. Fans, and the media, are generally too quick to deem rookies busts while also being too slow to recognize development. Very few rookies come into the NFL truly “pro ready”, and even the highest picks need some development. There’s also a tendency to grade on an entirely unfair curve based on unrealistic expectations.

It’s a byproduct of the state of sports media which rewards hot takes and instant reactions, to the point where there’s little value in measured, nuanced analysis or re-evaluation.

The Giants don’t have much left to play for in 2024. The best thing for the franchise is to secure as high a draft pick as possible so they can select a quarterback should they decide that one of them is “The Guy” for them. Of course, that means more losing and mounting pressure on everyone in the organization.

The next most important thing to see during the season is improvement by their 2022 and 2023 first-round picks. Even if the team is losing, that would go a long way toward alleviating the pressure on Joe Schoen and Brian Daboll.

They bear culpability for their part in where the Giants are now, but it neither starts nor ends with them. It’s taken a long time to get where we are now, and much of it has been spent trying to avoid engaging in a true rebuild.

Ed has lamented to me several times over the past couple weeks that the timing just hasn’t been right for the Giants. Eli had two years left when the 2018 class came, and the team just wasn’t quite ready to give up on Jones in 2024.

Personally, that puts me in mind of a saying I first heard several years ago: “New Yorkers never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” Or put more poetically in one of my favorite songs, “There’s no right time to fall out of love,” (“Fresh Kicks” by The Dead Deads).

Timing very rarely works out cleanly. The Indianapolis Colts released Peyton Manning before drafting Andrew Luck. The Kansas City Chiefs moved up to draft Pat Mahomes while Alex Smith was playing the best football of his career. The Green Bay Packers drafted Aaron Rodgers while they still had Brett Favre, and Jordan Love while they still had Aaron Rodgers.

Ultimately, one of the biggest reasons for the Giants’ disastrous season in 2024 is that they’ve spent much of the last decade kicking the can down the road. They wanted to afford Eli the same exit that Michael Strahan enjoyed – going out on top, with one last win on the biggest stage of them all. And it says a lot about the organization that they committed to doing that. Unfortunately, storybook endings typically only happen in storybooks.

And so now the Giants are forced to pay the Piper. The current mess is the sum total of their decisions to avoid or put off the exact situation in which they find themselves. And, as so often happens with messes, it was probably best dealt with when it was relatively small and manageable. Now, unfortunately, the manageable – but uncomfortable – mess has turned into an unruly monster that could consume yet another regime.